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Based on the Appraisal Tendency Framework on the antecedents and consequences
of emotions two experimental studies examined the relationship between externally
caused loss of control experiences and risk-taking behavior, as well as the assumed
mediation of this relationship by the emotion anger. An experimental paradigm for
inducing externally caused and consequently externally attributed loss of control which
should lead to experiences of anger was developed and pretested in a Pilot Study. The
relationship between loss of control experiences, anger, and risk-taking behavior was
investigated using two separate student samples from Germany (N = 84, 54% female)
and China (N = 125; 64% female). In line with our hypotheses, results showed that anger
mediated the link between subjective loss of control experiences and increasing risk-
taking behavior. Multiple group comparisons revealing similar patterns in both samples
affirmed the results’ cross-cultural generalizability. These results implicate that anger
makes people less risk averse in the process of economic decision making.
Keywords: perceived control, anger, risk-taking, attribution, cross-cultural study
Introduction
“Change is the only constant.”
(Heraclitus of Ephesus, approximately 535–475 BC)
(Heraclitus, 2001)
The world keeps changing around us. Ongoing rapid development and new technologies continue
to change our environments as well as our living and working conditions (Schober et al., 2007).
People are facing new challenges every day as everyone has to quickly learn about the latest
development, to newly orient, to adapt and get along with the new circumstances, and unknown
environments. People might ﬁnd these experiences demanding and associate them with a loss of
orientation and subjective feelings of uncertainty and loss of control.
The question of how externally caused experiences of loss of control aﬀect people’s decision-
making processes bears wide practical relevance. In this study, we investigate the eﬀects of
experimentally administered subjective loss of control experiences on risk-related decision making.
It seems plausible to assume that emotions play a special role in this relationship for two reasons.
First, perceived control is known to be a cognitive antecedent of emotions such as anxiety or
hopelessness (e.g., Skinner, 1996; Goetz et al., 2010), and, second, due to the well-known impact
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of emotional experiences on decision-making processes (e.g.,
Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). This study focuses on the role
of anger in particular as one central emotion and examines its
inﬂuence on the relationship between loss of control experiences
and risk-taking behavior. Additionally, the question arises as to
whether the assumed functional associations are generalizable,
especially across people from various cultures. Despite potential
cultural mean level discrepancies in control perceptions and
emotions (e.g., see Eid and Diener, 2001; Spector et al., 2004),
diﬀerences in structural relations and functional mechanisms
are not to be expected from a theoretical perspective as the
herein investigated variables (control perceptions and emotions
as well as their consequences) are considered to be basic and
universal (e.g., see Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995; Skinner, 1996;
Pekrun, 2006). We explore the cross-cultural generalization with
samples from Germany and China representing diﬀerent cultural
backgrounds.
Relation between Subjective Control and
Risk-Taking Behavior
There is a close association between perceptions of control
and risk taking. Although Skinner (2007, p. 912) considers
risky situations to be “prototypical cases of uncontrollability,”
subjective perceptions of control are an important facet of the
perceived riskiness of a hazard or situation. For example, illusions
of control (Langer, 1975; for a review, see Thompson et al.,
1998) have been shown to play an important role in chance
situations and, thus, in the evaluation of and attitudes toward
risks. Perceived controllability of a hazard was identiﬁed as
essential to one of two factors (i.e., “dread”) underlying people’s
risk perceptions (Slovic, 1987; Peters and Slovic, 1996). Thus,
it is reasonable to assume that perceived control impacts risk
perception and risk-related behavior (Thaler and Johnson, 1990;
Renn, 1998).
Perceived control is understood as the extent to which one
believes that he or she can predict or inﬂuence events (Bandura,
1989). Its importance for a broad range of psychological variables
is acknowledged and widely investigated (see Skinner, 1996 for a
review). Regarding behavioral outcomes, perceptions of control
have been included as a central construct in several theories
dealing with motivation and future behavior (Control Theory:
Glasser, 1984; Valence–Instrumentality–Expectancy Theory:
Vroom, 1964; Theory of planned behavior: Ajzen, 1991; Theory
of Learned Helplessness: Seligman, 1975; Abramson et al., 1978).
Risk-taking behavior, which can be deﬁned as an action with
uncertain consequences that might be either potentially positive
or harmful (Renn, 1998), is considered to be one speciﬁc facet
of decision-making behavior with an especially strong relation to
perceptions of control as outlined above. Thus, it seems plausible
that risk taking is inﬂuenced by prior experiences of personal
control, the more so when keeping in mind the close relation of
control and risk as well as the direct link between perceptions of
control and risk perceptions.
However, evidence for direct eﬀects of experiences of control
on risk-taking behavior is scarce. The relationship has largely
been investigated with a focus on the eﬀects of chronic losses
on future investment decisions (e.g., Rivers and Arvai, 2007).
More recently initial evidence for causal eﬀects of loss of control
experiences on risk propensity was provided (Wimmer et al.,
2010). In contrast to the previous studies, their experimental
manipulation induced internally attributable diﬃculty-related
loss of control (instead of assumingly chance-related chronic
losses) and the subjectively experienced perceptions of loss of
control were explicitly measured and thus interpretable. Results
demonstrated a causal relationship between prior experiences
of (internally attributed) loss of control and decreased risk-
taking behavior. Apart from this initial ﬁnding, research is largely
lacking. In the current study, we focus on externally attributable
loss of control and additionally assume that emotions might play
a signiﬁcant role in this relationship.
The Role of Emotions in the Relationship
between Loss of Control and Risk Taking
It is well-known that emotions arise from personally relevant
experiences of control, especially experiences with loss of
control (e.g., Skinner, 1996; Goetz et al., 2010). Additionally,
emotions powerfully inﬂuence decision-making processes (e.g.,
Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). In particular, incidental emotions
have been shown to impact decisions and thus can account
for spillover eﬀects between even objectively unrelated settings.
Therefore, emotions might operate as a link between loss of
control experiences and risk-taking behavior; more precisely,
they may be worthwhile to examine as a potential mediator of
this link.
The Relevance of Perceptions of Control for
Emotions
Cognitive emotion theories (e.g., see Lazarus et al., 1970; Scherer
et al., 2001) propose that emotions are not aroused by events
per se, but by cognitive evaluations or appraisals of the events,
and the resulting discrete emotions depend on this pattern
of appraisals. Several dimensions underlying these appraisals
have been discussed, among which control appraisals play a
prominent role. In various appraisal theories of emotions the
dimension of control is consistently identiﬁed as one of the
central appraisal dimensions and thus is regarded as a central
antecedent of emotions (e.g., Scherer, 1982; Smith and Ellsworth,
1985; Roseman et al., 1996).
Appraisal Dimension of Control and the Valence of
Emotions
The control-value theory (Pekrun, 2000, 2006) focusing on the
antecedents and development of emotions considers control to
be one of the two most important appraisal dimensions in the
emergence of emotions. Control-related cognitions are believed
to essentially determine the valence of emotions (i.e., positive vs.
negative) and appraisals of lack of control are associated with
negative emotions (Pekrun, 2000). Thus, generally, experiences
of loss of control due to changes in external conditions might
be associated with a variety of negative emotions, such as fear,
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anger, or hopelessness. The concrete emotional quality arising
from those experiences is inﬂuenced by additional factors, such
as evaluation of the circumstances and attributions of causes (e.g.,
Weiner, 1985).
Externally Caused Subjective Loss of Control and its
Emotional Consequences
This study is particularly concerned with the eﬀects of
experiences of loss of control caused by changes in external
conditions that handicap one’s task performance, but that lack a
personally threatening potential. Annoying technical diﬃculties
with computer hard- or software might be the everyday
counterpart of this experience. Given ongoing technological
developments and our reliance on technology, this kind of
experience is assumed to be ubiquitous in most people’s
daily work. Thus, our study deals with one’s subjective
experiences of loss of control and consequently the lack of
a possibility to fulﬁll one’s task and to produce the desired
performance.
The primary emotion arising under these circumstances is
assumed to be anger. In several studies, anger has been induced
by malfunctioning computer equipment (e.g., Deﬀenbacher et al.,
1996; Why and Johnston, 2008; Deﬀenbacher, 2011). In contrast
to fear, anger should be elicited by this kind of subjective
loss of control experience determined by external causes, but
lacking a personal threat. Anger is characterized as a retrospective
emotion following from negative developments and outcomes
(Pekrun, 2006) which are explicitly externally, not internally,
attributed. According to Weiner (1985), anger is an attribution-
dependent emotion implying an appraisal that one’s personal goal
attainment has been blocked (Kitayama et al., 2006). In addition
to these rather cognitive facets, anger is considered an activating
emotion (Shaver et al., 1987; Pekrun, 1992; Kleine et al., 2005) and
relates to an approach motivation to change the current situation
(Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009), which is especially interesting
in regard to the context of the current study because it points
toward subsequent behavior and decision making (Lerner and
Keltner, 2001).
Emotions and Their Impact on Risk-Taking
Behavior
Research has shown that risk-related decisions are not fully
understandable when only purely objective (“rational”) facts,
such as probability and severity of possible outcomes are
considered. Instead, subjective inﬂuences, such as incidental
aﬀective states (e.g., Waters, 2006), have emerged as important
predictors of these decisions. Following a considerable amount
of research focusing on the eﬀects of positive and negative mood
(e.g., work by Isen and colleagues; for a review see Isen, 2000),
recent research has gone beyond this valence dimension of aﬀect
and instead turned toward the diﬀerential eﬀects of speciﬁc
discrete emotions, such as fear, anger, or happiness (e.g., Lerner
and Keltner, 2001).
The Appraisal Tendency Framework (ATF; Lerner and
Keltner, 2000, 2001; see also Han et al., 2007) proposed a
general theoretical model describing emotion-speciﬁc impacts
on economic decision making. It allows a precise prediction
of the diﬀerential impact of discrete emotions on particular
decision-making processes and outcomes due to their link to
emotion-speciﬁc appraisal tendencies. Based on the premise
of appraisal theories that each emotion is characterized by a
unique appraisal pattern on central appraisal dimensions (such
as pleasantness, certainty, control; see Smith and Ellsworth,
1985), the ATF assumes that “each emotion activates a cognitive
predisposition to appraise future events in line with the
central-appraisal dimensions that triggered the emotion” (Lerner
and Keltner, 2000, p. 477). This cognitive predisposition for
future appraisals is called appraisal tendency and underlies
the carry-over eﬀects by which emotions inﬂuence subsequent
judgments and decision making. To exert strong inﬂuences,
the emotion’s central appraisal content must be thematically
linked to the decision-making topic (Lerner and Keltner,
2001).
In the context of risk-related decision making, the appraisal
dimensions certainty and control are thought to be particularly
inﬂuential due to their close association with cognitive
evaluations for determining risk assessments. The emotion
anger in particular is characterized by high appraisals of both
certainty and control (Lerner and Keltner, 2000), and is therefore
proposed to inﬂuence risk-related decisions. Thus, for our study’s
objective of investigating the consequences of subjective loss
of control experiences on risk-taking behavior, the eﬀects of
anger are particularly interesting and thus central to our focus –
and might appear counterintuitive at a ﬁrst glance: Despite
originally being elicited by loss of control experiences (which
in this study’s experimental manipulation are due to externally
attributable changes of objectively given circumstances), the
emotional experience of anger is subsequently assumed to be
accompanied by high certainty and control appraisals. These
accompanying appraisal tendencies are then expected to impact
subsequent risky decision making. Drawing from both the ATF
(due to high levels of certainty and control) and the notion of
anger being an activating emotion characterized by features
associated with approach motivation (Lerner and Tiedens,
2006; Carver and Harmon-Jones, 2009), anger is believed to
increase people’s risk-taking decisions. Therefore, because
our experimental paradigm was designed to elicit externally
attributed subjective loss of control and thus, anger, we assume
anger will mediate the impact of loss of control experiences on
risk-taking behavior.
Cultural Influences and Cross-Cultural
Universality
When considering previous studies on the variables we are
interested in, namely control experiences, anger, risk taking, and
their underlying mechanisms, such as causal attributions and
cognitive appraisals, cultural diﬀerences seem to be a relevant
issue. However, so far, the research on the cultural inﬂuences
of some of these aspects provides rather mixed results. Whereas
evidence on diﬀerences in behaviors, perceptions of, and attitudes
toward risks is not unambiguous (Bontempo et al., 1997; Weber
and Hsee, 1998; Rohrmann and Chen, 1999; Brumagim and Wu,
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2005), cross-cultural variations seem to be particularly pertinent
with respect to emotions and control perceptions, especially
when comparing individualistic and collectivistic cultures (for
deﬁnition of cultural value dimensions, see Triandis, 1994, 1995;
Hofstede, 2001).
With respect to control-related constructs, culture seems to
inﬂuence levels and patterns of general control beliefs (e.g.,
internal vs. external locus of control, primary vs. secondary
control). For example, people from Western European countries
seem to habitually perceive higher levels of personal, thus
internal, control than people from Eastern Asian countries (e.g.,
see Spector et al., 2004). In addition to the individual level,
there might also be diﬀerences with respect to the extent of
perceived power, control, and uncertainty at the country level (cf.,
cultural dimensions by Hofstede, 2001, such as power distance
index, uncertainty avoidance index). However, the personal need
for being able to control one’s environments is regarded as a
fundamental motive (Heckhausen and Schulz, 1995; Skinner,
1996). Correspondingly, the consequences of experiencing gains
in, maintenance of, or loss of control over personally relevant
situations or outcomes is considered universal and generalizable
across cultures.
Similarly, various facets of emotions have been shown to
be culturally inﬂuenced, for example, emotional expressivity,
norms for feeling and displaying emotions, and interpretations
and interpersonal consequences of emotions (e.g., Markus and
Kitayama, 1991; Eid and Diener, 2001; Mesquita and Walker,
2003; Van Hemert et al., 2007; Matsumoto et al., 2008). These
facets are – at least partly – able to explain cultural diﬀerences
in the frequency and intensity of emotions.
However, without questioning potential mean level diﬀerences
between cultures in various variables, basic relations between
constructs are typically considered to be cross-culturally
valid (also see Frenzel et al., 2007a,b for universality of
constructional associations despite mean level diﬀerences). For
example, “cognitive-aﬀective linkages” between attributions and
resulting emotions are not found to diﬀer cross-culturally
(Brown and Cai, 2010, p. 111). Pekrun (2006, p. 329) also
lends support for relative cross-cultural universality stating
“general functional mechanisms of human emotions are bound
to universal, species-speciﬁc characteristics of our mind.”
Further, previously mainly collective cultures are becoming
more and more individualistic, especially in those parts of
the world where the economy is growing (e.g., China),
which continually reduces diﬀerences between collectivistic and
individualistic countries (Hamamura, 2012; Steele and Lynch,
2013).
Instead of focusing on absolute levels or the intensity of
control and emotional experiences, in this study the eﬀects of
loss of control experiences on risk-taking behavior and the role
of anger in this relationship are at issue. More precisely, we
will explore whether these relational and functional associations
are cross-culturally generalizable. For this purpose, the eﬀects of
subjective loss of control experiences on anger and risk-taking
behavior will be investigated using samples from two countries,
namely Germany and China, which represent diﬀering cultural
backgrounds and which are characterized by numerous culturally
determined diﬀerences, also with respect to mean levels in the
variables of interest.
Research Aims and Hypotheses
In summary, the objectives of this set of studies are as follows:
ﬁrst, the impact of subjective experiences of loss of control due
to external changes in control conditions on subsequent risk-
taking behavior will be examined. Second, the role of anger in
this relationship will be investigated. Third, the cross-cultural
generalizability of the proposed relationships between subjective
loss of control, anger, and risk-taking behavior will be explored.
The ﬁrst aim is to develop an appropriate experimental
paradigm for inducing externally attributable subjective loss
of control (see Pilot Experimental Study) in order to allow
for the investigation of the proposed hypotheses. Following
the development of the experimental paradigm, the hypotheses
concerning the eﬀects of loss of control on anger and
risk-taking behavior are investigated (cf., Main Experimental
Study 1) and the cross-cultural generalizability of the proposed
relationships are explored with participants from diﬀerent
cultural (individualistic vs. collectivistic) backgrounds (cf., Main
Experimental Study 2):
Hypothesis 1: Externally caused and consequently externally
attributed loss of control experiences are assumed to cause
anger.
Hypothesis 2: Subjective loss of control experiences which
are attributed to external causes are assumed to increase
subsequent risk-taking behavior.
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between externally caused
and consequently externally attributed loss of control
experiences and increased risk-taking behavior is assumed
to be mediated by anger.
Hypothesis 4: The mediating eﬀect of anger on the relationship
between subjective loss of control and risk-taking behavior
is assumed to be cross-culturally generalizable.
Pilot Experimental Study
Aims
The objective of this Pilot Experimental Study was to test the
eﬀects of our newly developed experimental manipulation of
objective control conditions which was designed to induce a sense
of subjective loss of control due to external causes. This pilot
study aimed to investigate the assumed eﬀects of a manipulation
check in order to ensure the paradigm’s adequacy to explore the
previously proposed hypotheses in the subsequent experiments.
Method
Participants and Data Collection
Sample
N = 44 German university students (50% female) with an average
age of M = 21.52 years (SD = 1.98, range: 19–27) voluntarily
participated in this study. The participants were recruited using
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the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and they
were compensated by a ﬁxed show-up (9 €) fee plus payment
according to their individual performance in the problem-solving
game (theoretical range: 0–8 €). The assignment to the treatment
conditions was random with n = 22 (50% female) participants in
the experimental (EG) and n = 22 (50% female) participants in
the control group (CG).
Procedure and experimental design
The experimental study consisted of a one-factor pre–post design
with questionnaires following the baseline and manipulation
sections (cf., Figure 1). Following an instruction phase that
included a comprehension test, both the EG and CG played eight
rounds of an incentivized computer-based problem-solving task
(maximum proﬁt: 1 € per round) in which the participants had
to predict by mouse click where an object would be displayed
on a circle by recognizing the systematic pattern underlying
the previously displayed objects (for an example, see Figure 2).
The participants were paid according to their correct prediction
of the objects’ positions (prediction accuracy was transferred
into a monetary reward with the maximum precision being
compensated by 1 € per round). The patterns were determined
based on the angular distances of the subsequently displayed
objects; this is similar to a continuing number series or patterns
task which is frequently used to test non-verbal reasoning in
common tests of intelligence (for example, see the K-ABC-II,
Kaufman and Kaufman, 2004; CogAT6, Lohman and Hagen,
2001; CFT-20-R, Weiβ, 2006).
In order to avoid deception the written instruction before the
start of the experiment informed participants that unexpected
FIGURE 1 | One-factor pre–post design of Pilot Experimental Study
and Main Experimental Studies 1 and 2. The Pilot Experimental Study
tested the experimental paradigm’s adequacy for inducing subjective loss of
control. By decreasing the accuracy with which the participants’ prediction
was implemented into the computer game, the experimental group’s (EG’s)
objectively given control was increasingly reduced during the four rounds of
the manipulation section (represented by the darkening grey color). In a
one-factor pre–post design the EG and control (CG) group’s subjective control
ratings and external attributions following the baseline (t1) and manipulation
(t2) sections of the experiment were compared. Main Experimental Studies 1
and 2 applied the same experimental paradigm to investigate the effects of
loss of control on anger and risk-taking behavior in Germany and China,
respectively.
FIGURE 2 | A sample schematic representation of the computer-based
problem-solving task. Participants are asked to continuously indicate the
assumed next position of the little white circle while its previous positions fade
from dark gray to lighter shades of gray.
events may occur. The ﬁrst four rounds represented the baseline
section in which both the CG and EG were supposed to
experience subjective control; this section did not diﬀer between
the groups. The second four rounds belonged to themanipulation
section and the objectively given control was continuously
reduced for the participants in the EG. This induced loss of
control was obtained by decreasing the accuracy with which
the participants’ prediction of the object’s next position was
implemented into the computer game. Instead of displaying
the participant’s clicking position accurately, it was displayed
randomly within an interval including the chosen position.
The range of the interval increased gradually from ±3.5◦
in round 5, to ±10◦ (round 6), then ±30◦ (round 7), and
ﬁnally to ±90◦ in round 8 (cf., Figure 3). This computer-
based paradigm was designed using the Zurich Toolbox for
Readymade Economic Experiments (z-Tree; Fischbacher, 2007)
as experimental software.
Between the baseline and manipulation section (t1) as
well as at the end of the manipulation section (t2) the
participants answered a questionnaire on their subjective
perceptions of control and on their attributions for the
perceived control. Furthermore, in order to ensure general
comparability between the EG and CG, during a separate
follow-up attended by each participant within about 2 weeks
following the experimental part of the study, socio-demographic
(sex, age, subject of study, mother language, pre-experiences
with computer-games) and several potentially relevant
trait variables (non-verbal reasoning: German intelligence
test I-S-T 2000-R by Liepmann et al., 2007, English
version: Beauducel et al., 2010; locus of control: IPC by
FIGURE 3 | A sample schematic representation of the experimental
decreasing accuracy manipulation of displaying the participants’
prediction of the next position. The range of the intervals in which the
clicking position was displayed was ±3.5◦ centered around the actual chosen
position (red arrow) in round 5, ±10◦ in round 6, ±30◦ in round 7, and ±90◦
in round 8.
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Levenson, 1972, German version by Krampen, 1981) were
assessed1.
Variables and Study Measures
Subjective control
The participants’ subjective perceptions of control over their
outcomes with respect to the previously played round were
assessed twice, following both the baseline (t1) and manipulation
section (t2). The items, based on the Academic Control Scale
(Perry et al., 2001), were adapted to the experimental context
(e.g., “I could completely determine my outcomes”) and rated
on a seven-point-rating-scale ranging from 0 completely disagree
to 6 completely agree. Cronbach’s alphas of the two-item-measure
were α = 0.58 (t1) and α= 0.88 (t2).
Attributions
In order to control whether the experimentally manipulated
changes in control were in fact attributed to external causes
by the participants as intended, their attributions were assessed
following the baseline andmanipulation section. The participants
indicated to what extent they attributed their perceived control
to either internal or external causes (e.g., external attribution:
“My outcomes depended on inﬂuences lying outside myself”)
on seven-point-rating-scales ranging from 0 completely disagree
to 6 completely agree. The internal consistencies were α = 0.72
(t1) and α = 0.96 (t2) versus α = 0.68 (t1) and α = 0.87
(t2) for the two-item external versus internal attribution scales,
respectively.
Results
Subjective Control
Following the baseline part at t1 there were no signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences in the subjective control evaluations between the
treatment conditions, EG: M = 3.84, SD = 1.35 versus CG:
M = 3.75, SD = 1.56; t(42) = 0.21, p = 0.837, d = 0.06.
However, in line with our expectations, the EG rated their
subjective control signiﬁcantly lower than the CG following the
experimental manipulation at t2, t(42) = −8.14, p < 0.001,
d = −2.46 (EG:M = 0.84, SD = 1.03; CG:M = 4.11, SD = 1.58),
see Figure 4.
Attributions
The analyses of the attribution ratings showed that before the
experimental manipulation at t1 there was no signiﬁcant mean
group diﬀerences, neither in the extent of external attributions,
EG M = 1.23, SD = 0.95 versus CG: M = 1.09, SD = 1.06;
t(42) = 0.45, p = 0.656, d = 0.14, nor in the extent of internal
attributions, EG M = 4.64, SD = 1.00 versus CG: M = 4.68,
SD = 1.31; t(42) = −0.13, p = 0.898, d = −0.04. However,
following the experimental manipulation at t2, the participants in
the EG attributed the perceived control to be signiﬁcantly more
external than the participants in the CG [external attribution
scale: EG:M = 5.09, SD = 1.28 versus CG:M = 1.32, SD = 1.48;
t(42)= 9.06, p< 0.001, d= 2.73; see Figure 5; internal attribution
1There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences (all ps> 0.05) between the treatment groups
with respect to the socio-demographic variables, non-verbal reasoning indicators,
and general control beliefs, thus supporting the treatment groups’ equivalence.
FIGURE 4 | Subjective control ratings of the experimental and CG
following the baseline (t1) and the manipulation (t2) part of the Pilot
Experimental Study. Error bars represent SEM (±1 SE).
FIGURE 5 | External attributions of the EG and CG following the
baseline (t1) and the manipulation (t2) part of the Pilot Experimental
Study. Error bars represent SEM (±1 SE).
scale: EG:M = 1.07, SD = 1.47 versus CG:M = 4.41, SD = 1.59;
t(42) = −7.26, p < 0.001, d = −2.19; see Figure 6]. While
the extent of internal and external attributions stayed constant
between t1 and t2 in the CG (internal attribution: p = 0.389,
d = 0.19; external attribution: p = 0.448; d = −0.17), the
experimental manipulation caused highly signiﬁcant changes in
attributions within the EG: The internal attributions of control
decreased (p< 0.001, d = 2.34), whereas the external attributions
increased (p < 0.001, d = −2.79).
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FIGURE 6 | Internal attributions of the EG and CG following the
baseline (t1) and the manipulation (t2) part of the Pilot Experimental
Study. Error bars represent SEM (±1 SE).
Discussion
In this study the expected impact of the experimental
manipulation of objectively given control on attributions and the
subjectively perceived extent of control was supported. For the
participants of the EG, the manipulation applying decreasingly
accurate displays of the participant’s clicking position within
the computer-game led to a sense of subjective loss of control
compared to the baseline section and the CG. Furthermore, the
external attributions of perceived control signiﬁcantly increased
following the experimental manipulation whereas the internal
attributions signiﬁcantly decreased. The attributional pattern of
the EG shows the intended dominance of external compared to
internal attributions following the experimental manipulation at
t2. Thus, this study’s results provide evidence for the expected
impact of decreasing objective control on subjective control
ratings and provide support for the paradigms’ adequacy to
induce subjective loss of control experiences due to external
causes.
Main Experimental Study 1
Aims
Main Experimental Study 1 aimed at investigating the impact
of externally caused subjective loss of control on anger and
risk-taking behavior (Hypotheses 1–3) by applying the newly
developed and tested experimental paradigm inducing subjective
loss of control by decreasing the implementation accuracy during
the computer-based problem-solving task.
Method
Participants and Data Collection
Sample
The study was conducted at a German university using a student
sample consisting of N = 84 (54% female) participants recruited
via the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). The
participants had an average age of M = 21.93 years (SD = 1.93,
range: 19–27) and they were randomly assigned to the EG
(n = 44; 57% female) and the CG (n = 40; 50% female). Their
voluntary participation was compensated by a ﬁxed show-up fee
(11 €) as well as additional payment according to the subject’s
performance during the problem-solving task and risk game
(theoretical range: 0–20.40 €).
Procedure and experimental design
Main Experimental Study 1 used the experimental computer-
based game paradigm pretested in the Pilot Experimental Study.
However, instead ofmeasuring the participants’ perceived control
and attributions, following the baseline (t1) and manipulation
section (t2) their anger was assessed by a questionnaire.
Additionally, the participants’ behavior in a risky situation was
investigated (cf., Figure 1). Finally, a separate follow-up during
an about 2-week-interval after the experimental part of the study
was used to assess the socio-demographic and trait variables
(non-verbal reasoning, locus of control, as well as trait-based
risk-taking propensity: DOSPERT byWeber et al., 2002, German
version by Johnson et al., 2004)2.
Variables and Study Measures
Anger
Applying the subscale of the Diﬀerential Emotions Scale (DES;
Izard et al., 1974; as cited in Izard, 1977; German version: Merten
and Krause, 1993) consisting of three adjective items (“enraged,”
”angry,” “mad”), participants’ anger was assessed by their ratings
on a ﬁve point intensity rating scale ranging from 0 not at all to 4
very strong (e.g., “To what extent do you experience these feelings
at the moment?” “I feel. . .” “angry,”. . .)3. The three adjective-
subscale had an internal consistency of α= 0.84 at t1 and α= 0.94
at t2.
Risk-taking behavior
The participants’ risk-taking behavior was assessed by computer-
based variants of the “devil’s task” (Slovic, 1966) consisting of
a circle with a given number of equal sectors. All – except one
or two – of those sectors represent “secure” sectors, whereas the
remaining one or two sectors are the “devil’s” sectors. The subjects
knew how many sectors were secure and “devil’s” sectors, but
their positions were unknown to the participants. While choosing
a secure sector resulted in a gain of 0.10 € per sector, choosing
a devil’s sector caused the loss of all money in this round. The
participants were allowed to decide on both the number and
2The t-tests for equivalence did not reveal any signiﬁcant group diﬀerences
regarding the socio-demographic and trait variables (all ps > 0.05).
3Our experimental manipulation was designed to induce speciﬁcally the emotion
of anger (for the development of this manipulation, see Wimmer et al., 2009). In
order to be able to judge whether our manipulation would indeed have ﬁrst of
all eﬀects on anger experiences, we measured anger as well as nine other emotions
(anxiety, fear, sadness, shame, hopelessness, boredom, enjoyment, pride, and hope)
as a manipulation check after t2. In line with our expectation, the change of the
level of anger from t1 to t2 in the experimental group (EG) was signiﬁcantly
higher than those of nine other emotions (a repeatedmeasuresMANOVA, pairwise
comparisons from the emotion (t1/t2)× treatment condition (EG/CG) interaction
revealed all ps < 0.001). Thus anger was the emotion which was by far most
strongly triggered by the manipulation.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 June 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 774
Beisswingert et al. Loss of control, anger, and risk-taking behavior
position of ﬁelds they could choose. This task reﬂects a typical
risk situation with the number of chosen ﬁelds serving as the
(continuous) dependent variable with a theoretical range between
0 and 23 or 31 sectors depending on the version of the game:
The participants were presented one version of this game at t1
(31 sectors, one devil’s sector), and three immediately succeeding
versions at t2 (game 1: 23 sectors with one devil’s sector; game
2: 31 sectors, two devil’s sectors; game 3: 23 sectors, two devil’s
sectors). The reason for using diﬀerent variants of the devil’s task
was to avoid memory eﬀects and thus making the measurement
more reliable. In order to avoid any eﬀects on the subsequent
versions of the devil’s task, the participants did not receive any
immediate feedback on their results between the rounds, but only
at the end of the experiment. The internal consistency of the three
versions of the devil’s task at t2 was α = 0.86.
Results
Anger
In line with our assumptions there were no signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences before the manipulation at t1 [CG: M = 0.66,
SD = 0.87, EG: M = 0.69, SD = 0.89, t(82) = −0.16, p = 0.872,
d = −0.04]. In contrast, and supporting Hypothesis 1, the
members of the EG showed signiﬁcantly higher levels of anger
following the externally attributable subjective loss of control
manipulation (M = 2.23, SD = 1.22) than the participants in the
CG (M = 0.80, SD = 0.97), t(82) = −5.90, p < 0.001, d = −1.29
(see Figure 7).
Risk-Taking Behavior
Similarly, there was no group diﬀerence with respect to the
risk-taking behavior in the baseline section (average proportion
of chosen sections in the devil’s task; theoretical range: 0–1)
at t1: CG: M = 0.42, SD = 0.15, EG: M = 0.42, SD = 0.17,
FIGURE 7 | Anger ratings of the EG and CG following the baseline (t1)
and the manipulation (t2) part of the Main Experimental Study 1. Error
bars represent SEM (±1 SE).
t(82) = 0.01, p = 0.990, d = 0.002. Following the experimental
manipulation, the EG tended to take more risks as compared to
the CG (see Figure 8). During the three rounds of the devil’s task
the EG’s proportion of chosen sections on average wasM = 0.44
(SD= 0.11), while the CG’s wasM= 0.40 (SD= 0.10). This group
diﬀerence was marginally signiﬁcant, t(82) = −1.64, p = 0.053,
with d= −0.36 representing a small eﬀect size (Cohen, 1988) and
providing partial support for Hypothesis 2.
Anger as a Mediator of the Relationship between
Subjective Loss of Control and Risk-Taking Behavior
In order to examine the mediating eﬀect of anger on the
relationship between the subjective loss of control manipulation
and subsequent risk-taking behavior as postulated in Hypothesis
3, we applied structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques
(see Byrne, 2010; Kline, 2010) which provide excellent methods
for testing indirect eﬀects. The proposed mediation was modeled
with anger and risk-taking behavior as latent variables (cf.,
Figure 9). The three items of the anger subscale of the DES
were modeled as manifest indicators of the latent variable anger.
Similarly, the mean proportion of chosen sectors in the three
devil’s task rounds following the experimental manipulation
section at t2 served as manifest indicators of the latent variable
risk-taking behavior. The proposed mediating eﬀect was modeled
by the three unidirectional paths leading from the manifest
variable, subjective loss of control manipulation (independent
variable), toward the latent variables anger and risk-taking
behavior as well as from the latent variable anger (mediator)
toward the latent variable risk-taking behavior (dependent
variable).
The results of the CFA showed that the proposed model was
not rejected in the test of signiﬁcance (χ2 = 17.21, df = 12,
p = 0.142) and showed very satisfactory model ﬁt indexes
FIGURE 8 | Risk-taking behavior of the EG and CG represented by the
mean proportion of chosen sectors during the devil’s task following
the baseline (t1) and the manipulation (t2) part of the Main
Experimental Study 1. Error bars represent SEM (±1 SE).
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FIGURE 9 | Structural equation model for testing the indirect effect
(Hypothesis 3) of Main Experimental Study 1 on a latent variable level.
The coefficients represent standardized factor loadings and standardized
regression paths in the German sample (N = 84). ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗∗p < 0.001.
(CFI = 0.987; RMSEA = 0.072; SRMR = 0.046) which are in
line with the recommended cutoﬀ criteria for acceptable model
ﬁt (Hu and Bentler, 1999). The standardized indirect eﬀect of the
subjective loss of control manipulation on risk-taking behavior
via anger in this model was 0.15, p = 0.013. The Sobel test for the
latent regression path coeﬃcients was signiﬁcant with z = 2.03,
p = 0.042.
Thus, the analyses of indirect eﬀects supported the mediating
eﬀect of anger proposed in Hypothesis 3. Furthermore,
the conﬁrmatory factor analysis added evidence for a very
satisfactory general ﬁt of the proposed model.
Discussion
This study provided evidence for the assumed eﬀects of externally
caused subjective loss of control on anger and risk-taking
behavior. As expected, following the externally attributable
experimental manipulation of objective control, the participants
reported increased levels of anger and tended to act more
riskily in a subsequent decision-making setting. The group
diﬀerence with respect to the risk-taking behavior was only
marginally signiﬁcant (e.g., Cohen, 1992). Further, the eﬀect size
of the mean diﬀerence which – according to Cohen’s (1988)
guidelines – is regarded as a small eﬀect. In sum, the empirical
data supported the assumed mediating role of anger on the
relationship between subjective loss of control and risk-taking
behavior. In conclusion, the results of Main Experimental Study
1 were in line with our expectations and provided supporting
evidence for Hypotheses 1–3.
Main Experimental Study 2
Aims
The objective of Main Experimental Study 2 was to test
Hypothesis 4 which proposes the assumedmediating mechanism
of anger on the relationship between subjective loss of control
and risk-taking behavior will be generalizable cross-culturally.
For this reason the Main Experimental Study 1 was replicated
within a Chinese sample4 to allow for cross-cultural comparisons.
Method
Participants and Data Collection
Sample
N = 125 (64% female) Chinese students participated in the
replication study. The average age was M = 20.44 years
(SD = 1.78, range: 17–28). The participants were randomly
assigned to the EG (n= 61; 61% female) and the CG (n= 64; 67%
female) and compensated by a ﬁxed show-up fee (48 RMB) with
additional payment given according to their performance in the
problem-solving and risk game (theoretical range: 0–91.80 RMB).
Procedure, variables, and experimental design
Main Experimental Study 2 applied the same procedures,
measures, and experimental design in the Chinese sample as the
Main Experimental Study 1 in the German sample (cf., Figure 1).
Thus, following the baseline (t1) and the manipulation part (t2)
of the experimental design, anger as well as risk-taking behavior
were assessed. To create a Chinese version of the anger subscale
of the DES (Izard et al., 1974; as cited in Izard, 1977), the
German version (Merten and Krause, 1993) was subjected to
a multiple stage translation process consisting of independent
forth- and back-translations by two professional translators,
4Before replicating the main experimental study, a pretest similar to the German
pilot study was applied in order to test the design’s adequacy to induce externally
attributed subjective loss of control in Chinese participants. The sample consisted
of N = 63 (68% female) participants (age:M = 21.10 years, SD = 1.84, range: 18–
26) with random assignment of n = 32 (69% female) participants to the EG and
n= 31 (68% female) participants to the control group (CG). t-tests for equivalence
showed no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences (all ps > 0.05) between the EG and CG
with respect to socio-demographic and trait variables (locus of control: IPC by
Levenson, 1972, German version by Krampen, 1981; risk propensity: DOSPERT by
Weber et al., 2002, German version by Johnson et al., 2004; Chinese items for both
measures had been developed during this study based on the German versions).
In line with the expectations, at t1 there were no signiﬁcant group diﬀerences
in the ratings of subjective control [CG: M = 3.90, SD = 1.14; EG: M = 3.72,
SD = 1.28; t(61) = −0.61, p = 0.547, d = −0.15], internal [CG: M = 3.94,
SD = 1.59, EG: M = 3.98, SD = 1.46; t(61) = 0.127, p = 0.899, d = 0.03] and
external attributions [CG: M = 1.39, SD = 1.14, EG: M = 1.81, SD = 1.05;
t(61) = 1.541, p = 0.129, d = 0.39]. However, following the experimental
manipulation at t2, the EG rated their perceived control signiﬁcantly lower
(M = 1.14, SD = 1.12) than the CG [M = 4.08, SD = 1.12; t(61) = −10.44,
p < 0.001, d = −2.63] and showed signiﬁcantly higher external attributions
(M = 4.02, SD = 1.88) as compared to the CG [M = 1.65, SD = 1.22;
t(61) = 7.82, p < 0.001, d = 1.97] and also as compared to t1 [t(31) = −8.098,
p < 0.001, d = −1.43]. Accordingly, the EG’s internal attributions at t2 were
signiﬁcantly lower (M = 1.50, SD = 1.11) as compared to the CG’s [M = 3.90,
SD = 1.37; t(61) = −7.633, p < 0.001, d = −1.92] and also as compared to t1
[t(31) = 7.915, p < 0.001, d = 1.41]. Thus, the attributional pattern within the
EG following the experimental manipulation was characterized by low internal and
high external attributions as intended and expected. These results were comparable
to those of the German sample and provided evidence for the applicability of the
experimental design to Chinese participants which we considered as a prerequisite
for conducting Main Experimental Study 2.
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as well as comparisons, revisions, and a pretest with Chinese
students. The internal consistency of the translated three-items-
anger subscale was α = 0.84 at t1 and α = 0.90 at t2. Identical
to the Main Experimental Study 1, the participants’ risk-taking
behavior was assessed by one or three rounds of the devil’s task
(Slovic, 1966) at t1 and t2, respectively. The internal consistency
of the three versions of the devil’s task at t2 was α = 0.91.
In accordance with the Chinese currency, choosing one secure
sector resulted in a gain of 0.45 RMB and the maximum proﬁt
in the computer-based problem-solving game was 4.50 RMB per
round. Socio-demographic and trait variables were assessed later
the same day during a separate part following the experimental
section of the study in order to allow for trait-based comparability
between the EG and CG.
Results
Anger
In line with our assumptions there were no signiﬁcant group
diﬀerences before the manipulation at t1 [CG: M = 0.09,
SD = 0.26, EG:M = 0.16, SD = 0.44, t(123) = −1.09, p = 0.280,
d = −0.07]. In contrast, and supporting Hypothesis 1, the
members of the EG showed signiﬁcantly higher levels of anger
following the externally attributable subjective loss of control
manipulation (M = 1.22, SD = 0.97) than the participants in
the CG (M = 0.32, SD = 0.55), t(123) = −4.99, p < 0.001,
d = −0.70.
Considering the cultural diﬀerences of intensity of anger
between the two samples in China and Germany, the Chinese
anger ratings were lower than the German ratings at both t1
[China: M = 0.12, SD = 0.36, Germany: M = 0.67, SD = 0.87,
t(207) = −6.32, p < 0.001, d = −0.55] and t2 [China:M = 0.66,
SD = 0.85, Germany: M = 1.55, SD = 1.31, t(207) = −5.89,
p < 0.001, d = −0.88].
Risk-Taking Behavior
Similarly, there was no group diﬀerence with respect to the risk-
taking behavior in the baseline section (average proportion of
chosen sections in the devil’s task; theoretical range: 0–1) at t1:
CG:M= 0.40, SD= 0.21, EG:M= 0.41, SD= 0.21, t(123)= 0.01,
p= 0.397, d= −0.010. Following the experimental manipulation,
during the three rounds of the devil’s task the EG’s proportion of
chosen sections on average was M = 0.38 (SD = 0.15), and the
CG’s wasM = 0.35 (SD = 0.19). This group diﬀerence was in the
assumed direction but did not reach signiﬁcance, t(123)= −1.20,
p = 0.116, with d = −0.037.
Anger as a Mediator of the Relationship between
Subjective Loss of Control and Risk-Taking Behavior
Applying the multiple group comparison procedure we speciﬁed
a sequence of three models with nested structures and increasing
constraints of equality in order to test the invariance of the
proposed models between the two samples in Germany and
China. Model 1 (baseline model, identical to the model testing
the mediation eﬀect on a latent variable level in Main Experiment
1) tested for the invariance of the model form without any
constraints. Model 2 included constrained factor loadings
assuming that the measurement weights of the latent variables
anger and risk-taking behavior on their manifest indicators
operate equivalently across the two samples. Model 3 additionally
tested for the invariance of the regression paths between the
independent variable, mediating variable and dependent variable
proposing the relationships to be comparable in both samples. In
order to evaluate the adequacy of the models and their included
invariance assumptions, the absolute as well as relative model ﬁt
(changes in model ﬁt due to additionally imposed constraints)
were considered (e.g., Little, 1997; Byrne, 2010). Goodness-of-
ﬁt statistics and indexes of the three models are displayed in
Table 1.
Additionally, within the proposed models the indirect eﬀects
of the subjective loss of control manipulation on risk-taking
behavior via anger were analyzed and tested for signiﬁcance based
on bootstrapping procedures. The results of the indirect eﬀect
analyses for all models and both samples are presented in Table 2.
The results revealed a good overall ﬁt for the baseline Model
1 [χ2(24) = 30.70, p = 0.163; CFI = 0.993; RMSEA = 0.037]
and the indirect eﬀects reached signiﬁcance both in the German
(standardized indirect eﬀect: 0.15, p = 0.009, one-tailed, due to
the directed eﬀect) and Chinese sample (standardized indirect
eﬀect: 0.06, p= 0.039, one-tailed, due to the directed eﬀect). Thus,
the assumed mediating eﬀect was supported and the invariance
of the model form was conﬁrmed in both samples. The Chinese
sample’s standardized coeﬃcients of the model are presented in
Figure 10.
Constraining the factor loadings to be invariant in Germany
and China caused a marginal, but not signiﬁcant loss of
model ﬁt [Likelihood-ratio-test: χ2(4) = 9.12, p = 0.058].
The CFI = 0.005 was smaller than the recommended 0.01
cutoﬀ criterion (Cheung and Rensvold, 2002), thus representing
negligible loss of ﬁt and supporting the invariance of the factor
loadings between the two samples.
Imposing additional constraints referring to the equality of
the regression paths in Model 3 also resulted in a small, but
TABLE 1 | Model fit statistics and indexes of the three nested models of multiple group analysis with the German and Chinese sample.
Model fit
χ2 df P CFI RMSEA
Model 1 Invariance of model form 30.70 24 0.163 0.993 0.037
Model 2 Invariance of factor loadings 39.82 28 0.069 0.988 0.045
Model 3 Invariance of regression paths 46.14 31 0.039 0.984 0.049
N(Germany) = 84, N(China) = 125. All p-values refer to one-tailed tests.
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TABLE 2 | Tests of standardized indirect effects within the three nested models of multiple group analysis in the German and Chinese sample.
Germany China
Indirect effect p Indirect effect p
Model 1 Invariance of model form 0.15 0.009 0.06 0.039
Model 2 Invariance of factor loadings 0.15 0.009 0.06 0.036
Model 3 Invariance ofregression paths 0.10 0.003 0.06 0.003
N(Germany) = 84, N(China) = 125. All p-values refer to one-tailed tests. The tests of significance of the standardized indirect effects (ab paths) were performed based on
5000 bootstrap samples and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals.
FIGURE 10 | Structural equation model for testing the indirect effect
on a latent variable level in Main Experimental Study 2. This model also
served as baseline model (Model 1) for testing the cross-cultural
generalizability (Hypothesis 4). The coefficients represent standardized factor
loadings and regression paths of the baseline model 1 in the Chinese sample
(N = 125). ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01.
insigniﬁcant loss of model ﬁt [χ2(3)= 6.32, p= 0.097] with the
CFI = 0.004 again not exceeding the cutoﬀ criterion for nested
model comparisons. Model 3 showed very satisfying model ﬁt
indexes (CFI= 0.984; RMSEA= 0.049) and, despite the imposed
constraints, the indirect eﬀect of subjective loss of control on
risk-taking behavior via anger was also signiﬁcant in this model
(standardized indirect eﬀects: Germany: 0.10, China: 0.06, both
ps = 0.003, one-tailed). With the invariance of both the factor
loadings and regression paths between the German and Chinese
sample and the signiﬁcant indirect eﬀects, these results provided
evidence for the cross-cultural generalizability and supported
Hypothesis 4.
Discussion
Based on the results showing the experimental design’s
applicability for inducing externally attributed subjective loss
of control in China, and thus in a sample with a diﬀerent
cultural background, this study demonstrated the cross-cultural
generalizability of the results found in Main Experimental
Study 1. Based on excellent model ﬁts for the mediation path
model and the signiﬁcant indirect eﬀect of anger, the eﬀects
of externally caused subjective loss of control on increased risk
taking due to the elicitation of anger were replicated in the
Chinese sample. Furthermore, multiple group analyses indicated
invariance of both the structural and measurement model
between the German and Chinese samples. Thus, by comparing
the results gained in the Western European and the East Asian
sample, this study provided evidence for the hypothesized cross-
cultural generalizability of the proposed relationships and the
mediating eﬀect of anger.
General Discussion
These studies investigated how loss of control experiences due
to changes in our external environment impact subsequent
risk-taking behavior, as well as the role that anger plays in
this relationship and the cross-cultural generalizability of
the functional mechanisms. In line with the assumptions,
loss of control experiences considerably inﬂuenced both
emotional experiences and subsequent behavior and their
impact was demonstrated cross-culturally. Strong support for
the hypothesized eﬀect of subjective loss of control experiences
on subsequent risk-taking behavior was provided in this
set of studies. Subjective control due to changes in external
conditions – and thus externally attributable – was shown to
arouse anger. Furthermore, anger mediated the relationship
between control experiences and risky decision making. These
functional relationships and their underlying mechanism were
detected in both samples fromWestern Europe and East Asia and
therefore provided support for cross-cultural generalizability.
Thus, all of the studies’ results were in line with our hypotheses
and contribute to a deeper understanding of how immediately
preceding experiences of control impact risk-related decision
making in a subsequent, objectively unrelated setting.
As expected, and regarding their close association, the
relevance of control experiences for decision making under
risk conditions was demonstrated. The decisions of participants
exposed to loss of control diﬀered signiﬁcantly from the decisions
of participants who were able to maintain their personal control.
More precisely, people who had experienced a gradual loss of
control over their outcomes tended to act more riskily in the
subsequent decision-making context. This ﬁnding might appear
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rather surprising as prior experiences of loss of control might be
assumed to elicit cautious behavior and eﬀorts to regain control
instead of giving rise to even more uncertainty. Thus, at ﬁrst
glance, careful and risk-averse behavior might appear to be more
plausible and reasonable. However, when reviewing previous
research on the eﬀects of chronic losses, wide support for
increasing investment can be found (for example in the form of
the sunk cost eﬀect, Arkes and Blumer, 1985, and as an escalation
of commitment, Staw, 1976). The speciﬁc eﬀects of prior
loss of control experiences depend on the evaluation of these
experiences, for example, the appraisals and attributions of the
causes. As supported in the Pilot Experimental Study, the loss of
control experience in this study was characterized by an external
causation and blockage of one’s goal attainment, but without
personally threatening potential. Thus, the emotion of anger
aroused by these experiences and its behavioral consequences was
the critical aspect predicting subsequent risk taking. As expected,
the mediating role of anger was most inﬂuential with respect to
the increasing risk-taking behavior following the loss of control
experiences.
Our results are in line with both theoretical models explaining
how emotions impact decision-making processes in general and
previous research on the eﬀects of anger in particular. This
study adds empirical evidence on the eﬀect of anger on decision
making in risky settings. Anger following from subjective loss of
control experiences due to changes in external conditions caused
increased risk-taking behavior. This observation is compatible
with the notion of anger making people feel more conﬁdent
and encouraging them to actively approach a situation (e.g., see
Lerner and Tiedens, 2006).
According to the ATF (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001) the
risk-related inﬂuence of anger can be explained by high levels
of certainty and control appraisals. This aspect is especially
interesting in the context of our study in which anger emerged
as a powerful mediator of the relationship between loss of
control experiences and risk-taking behavior. On the one hand,
it provides a feasible explanation for the observed increase in
risk-taking behavior. On the other hand, these feelings of high
certainty and control may appear counterintuitive and seem to
stand in contrast to the subjective loss of control experiences
intended to be induced by the experimental manipulation.
However, the ﬁndings of the Pilot Experimental Study can rule
out any doubts that the experimental manipulation to decrease
objectively given control may have failed to induce the intended
sense of loss of control. In both samples the EG members
rated their personal control signiﬁcantly lower following the
experimental manipulation as compared to the CG (and the
baseline part). Instead, the apparent “regain” of a sense of
certainty and control should be due to the cognitive evaluations
of the loss of control experiences, which were shown to be
characterized by external attributions and increasing anger, as
previously proposed. The emotional experience of anger thus
appears to be the crucial underlying mechanism linking the loss
of control experiences with the increased risk-taking behavior in
the subsequent, objectively unrelated decision-making context.
Although elicited by subjective loss of control experiences,
anger might have led to a sense of regained certainty due
to its accompanying appraisal tendencies and thus has been
demonstrated to play a vital role in the context of control and
risk. Therefore, the experimental manipulation not only induced
subjective loss of control, but – via attribution processes –
elicited anger which in turn (via high certainty and control
appraisals) impacted the subsequent risk-taking behavior by
opposing excessive risk aversion.
Therefore, this study provides support for the inﬂuence of
emotions as a rather subjective variable inﬂuencing the decision-
making process. In this study concrete behavior, namely actual
risk taking, diﬀered remarkably depending on prior control and
emotional experiences. This is in contrast to much other previous
research examining possible impacts on decision making, which
has focused on perceptions or cognitive estimations of risk
instead of actual behavior (e.g., Lerner et al., 2003; Fischhoﬀ
et al., 2005). It can be informative to look at precursors of
decisions, such as cognitive evaluations of diﬀerent alternatives,
while researching decision making, but it is not suﬃcient. In
the end, the actual choice, the behavior, represents the ﬁnal
outcome of the decision-making process. Thus, by supporting
the hypotheses our results both add evidence for the theoretical
assumptions and go beyond existing ﬁndings by demonstrating
eﬀects on behavior.
Furthermore, by exploring the cross-cultural generalizability
this study contributed to understanding cultural issues in
the relation between control experiences, anger, and risk-
taking behavior. Through the comparison of the results
of both our samples from Germany, representing Western
Europe, and China, representing an East Asian cultural
background, the cross-cultural applicability of the proposed
relations between the variables was supported. In both Germany
and China participants reported signiﬁcantly higher levels of
anger following the externally attributed loss of control and
tended to make riskier decisions with this behavioral eﬀect being
mediated by anger. In regard to possible cultural inﬂuences on
our included variables, our ﬁndings are remarkably interesting.
When focusing on the levels of anger participants reported,
one of the variables especially informed by culture, there
do in fact seem to be diﬀerences between the two samples,
with the Chinese anger ratings generally being lower than
the German ratings. This is in line with previous ﬁndings
showing that individualistic and collectivistic cultures generally
diﬀer in intensities of reported emotions with China showing
particularly low norms and intensity scores (Eid and Diener,
2001). For negative emotions that might threaten the desired
interdependence between individuals in collectivistic cultures
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991), such as anger, this might be
especially true.
It is also worthwhile to have a closer look at the direct eﬀects
of the experimental manipulation of personal control and their
cross-cultural inﬂuences. Despite some evidence for the fact that
people from various cultures might diﬀer in their habitually
perceived locus of control – with Western European countries
tending to perceive higher levels of personal, thus internal,
control than Eastern Asian countries – the eﬀects of experiences
of loss of control was assumed to be cross-culturally generalizable.
In fact, the Experimental Pilot Study showed the eﬀects of the
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experimental loss of control manipulation on control ratings
were exactly as intended in the German and the Chinese sample.
Both the patterns of control ratings and attributions
demonstrated the paradigm’s adequacy to induce subjective loss
of control attributed to external causes in the Chinese sample as
well. These ﬁndings counter the argument that the experimental
manipulation might have had weaker eﬀects in the Chinese
sample since they may be used to lower levels of personal control
due to a habitually more external locus of control (see also
Scherer and Brosch, 2009, on the relationship of attributions
and perceived control) and instead speaks for the cross-cultural
applicability of the experimental paradigm. Furthermore, the
relevance of experiences and appraisals of personal control for
emotions and behavior has been conﬁrmed cross-culturally. The
eﬀects of loss of control experiences on risk-taking behavior via
anger were also demonstrated in both samples. Additionally, this
study supports the applicability of the emotions-behavior link
as proposed by the ATF which had previously been questioned
for people from collectivistic cultures (Lerner and Keltner,
2001). The eﬀect of anger on risk-related decisions within the
Chinese sample was in line with the same direction of the
eﬀect in the German sample. In conclusion, despite (possibly
habitual) diﬀerences in anger ratings and external attributions,
the functional relationships between the variables following the
loss of control experiences were shown to be generalizable across
cultures as hypothesized. One reason for similar mechanisms
in both samples might be, that collectivistic and individualistic
cultures havemore andmore converged in recent years due to the
economic growing (Hamamura, 2012; Steele and Lynch, 2013).
Limitations
Although, this study supports all hypothesized functional
relationships between subjective loss of control, anger, and risk-
taking behavior, and it conﬁrms these ﬁndings cross-culturally,
there are some limitations that should be taken into account.
The ﬁrst limitation relates to the limited cross-cultural scope.
This study deals with the cross-cultural generalizability of the
proposed functional mechanisms. For this purpose, the study
was conducted with participants from two countries representing
diﬀerent cultural backgrounds: A sample of German participants
representing the Western European culture and a sample of
Chinese participants representing the Eastern Asian culture.
These cultures are known to diﬀer on a variety of dimensions,
among which the diﬀerentiation between individualism and
collectivism is probably most prominent (e.g., see Triandis, 1994,
1995; Hofstede, 2001). A great deal of research on cultural
eﬀects and cross-cultural comparability has been made on the
basis of this dimension. Thus, comparing samples diﬀering on
this dimension in order to explore cultural inﬂuences might be
reasonable. Still, one has to keep in mind that drawing ﬁnal
conclusions about cross-cultural universality is – for several
reasons – not possible by investigating samples from only two
countries. Therefore, until several further replications have been
conducted the results of this ﬁrst step should be handled with
care.
However, there are several lines of evidence from the current
study that explicitly speak to the interpretability of the reported
ﬁndings. First, by investigating samples from Germany and
China, two countries which are well-known to diﬀer remarkably
in a range of aspects, both with respect to country and
individual level variables, were chosen. Although diﬀerences
in mean levels of the variables of interest, such as control
perceptions and emotions, are reported in the literature and
correspondingly could also be found in our study, the functional
relationships were consistent between the two samples, which are
in line with the expectations and speaks for their cross-cultural
generalizability. Second, in order to evaluate the generalizability
of the results, the representativeness of the chosen countries
with respect to their cultural area should be considered. For
example, China’s individualism score is remarkably lower than
the average score of Eastern Asian countries (Hofstede, 2001).
From this perspective, the results of this study might even be
underestimated, as the diﬀerence between Germany and China
might be even bigger than the diﬀerence between Germany
and East Asian countries on average. This deliberation argues
strongly for the generalizability between the two cultures. Thus,
by comparing a German and a Chinese sample, two samples
which can be considered to represent the opposite poles of the
often-investigated individualism-collectivism dimension, a ﬁrst
valuable step toward interpreting a cross-cultural generalizability
has been made.
The second limitation refers to the context of the experimental
induction of loss of control. Our experimental manipulation
of changes in objectively given control due to external
circumstances was speciﬁcally intended to induce a sense
of loss of control that was attributable externally, lacked a
personal threat, and aroused anger. Through this experimental
manipulation, a rather moderate intensity of anger with mean
anger ratings around (Germany) or even below (China) the
center of the ﬁve-point-rating scale was aroused. However,
several similar, but not identical scenarios of loss of control
experiences are imaginable. For example, slightly diﬀerent
conditions might elicit much stronger intensities of anger that
would probably be associated with signiﬁcant riskier decision
making. Furthermore, instead of a continuous change in objective
control as applied in our experimental paradigm by decreasing
the objectively given control over the course of four rounds
of the computer game, the loss of control experiences might
have occurred more abruptly and might have aroused surprise
rather than anger. Additionally, the changes might have been
associated with a feeling of personal threat and thus elicited fear.
Therefore, although these alternatives also deal with externally
attributable subjective loss of control experiences and would
require only small changes in the experimental manipulation that
can easily be implemented in our experimental paradigm (e.g.,
by reducing the number of rounds in the manipulation section
or changing ﬁnancial incentives), their eﬀects on emotions,
and subsequent risk-taking behavior are presumed to diﬀer
fundamentally. When interpreting our ﬁndings it is important
to keep the special circumstances of our study in mind, that is,
with risk-related behavior impacted by loss of control experiences
arousing moderate levels of anger.
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Implications
The results of this study on the hypothesized eﬀect of subjective
loss of control on anger and risk-taking behavior suggest several
theoretical, methodological, and practical implications as well as
raise some questions for future research.
Anger was demonstrated to mediate the relationship between
loss of control experiences and increased risk-taking behavior.
As proposed by the ATF (Lerner and Keltner, 2000, 2001) the
risk-related inﬂuence of anger is due to high certainty and
control appraisals, which generally accompany and typically
characterize this emotion. In our context, aimed at investigating
the consequences of subjective loss of control, this contrasting
eﬀect appears to be especially interesting. Although in the
present study certainty evaluations with respect to the risk-
related decision have not been explicitly measured, this aspect
deserves more attention and should be addressed in future
research. The question arises as to whether experiencing anger
could show a way of attenuating the often reported negative
eﬀects following subjective loss of control experiences and partly
compensates for these consequences, at least in the face of
risky decision making. Our study’s results seem to suggest
this interpretation, as anger appeared to make people less risk
averse. Furthermore, one might suppose this encouraging eﬀect
of anger on increasing risk-taking behavior to be especially
beneﬁcial when following loss of control experiences since these
experiences may hinder bold behavior. Thus, though opposite in
nature, the combination of anger and loss of control experiences
may contribute to a more risk-neutral decision, as long as
the anger is not in excess. Before being able to make more
detailed statements, a deeper understanding of the relationship
between the obviously contrasting eﬀects of loss of control
experiences and certainty experiences due to anger is required.
Conditions and limitations of this relationship need to be further
investigated, in order to – for example – provide practical
implications, such as giving advice for adaptive coping strategies
after perceived lack of control in economic or achievement
situations.
Related to the question of how loss of control experiences
can exert spillover eﬀects to subsequent objectively unrelated
settings via emotions is the question about the limits of this
mechanism. For example, can purposively elicited or suppressed
anger account for adaptive responses either following subjective
loss of control or in the face of risk-related decisions? As
suggested by Lerner and Keltner (2001, p. 156), awareness
is one of the boundary conditions since “becoming aware
of one’s own judgment and choice process should deactivate
appraisal tendencies, even if the emotion itself persists.” In
our experimental design, emotions were assessed via self-
report immediately before the decision process. Thus, in both
our German and Chinese sample, reﬂecting on one’s own
emotions did not seem to impair the eﬀect of anger on risk-
taking behavior. Considering the proposition by Lerner and
Keltner (2001), a possible explanation might imply that although
the emotion has been assessed via self-report – and thus it
is assumed that one is aware of it – it is not cognitively
associated with the subsequent decision-making process. In
this case it can exert carry over eﬀects between unrelated
settings despite awareness of the feeling, which is an interesting
and possibly inﬂuential assumption certainly worthy of further
investigation.
Finally, further research is encouraged as a consequence
of the methodological contribution of this study. During
the Pilot Experimental Studies, an experimental paradigm for
inducing externally attributable subjective loss of control (and
consequently anger) was developed. Its adequacy was successfully
supported in both the German and the Chinese sample,
thus additionally suggesting its cross-cultural applicability. This
methodological innovation facilitates further research on the
eﬀects of loss of control experiences due to external causes,
an issue that up to now largely lacked proper methods for
investigation. Considering people’s everyday experiences of
externally caused loss of control, the newly developed and herein
introduced experimental paradigm provides easy access to this
highly relevant research topic.
Conclusion
Perceiving oneself to be a competent person and in control of
personally relevant outcomes has generally been proposed to
be a fundamental human need (Skinner, 1996). Therefore, the
importance of control perceptions for emotions and behavior has
already been a focus of research for quite a time, often with a
concentration on the detrimental consequences of lack of control
experiences. However, in the face of ongoing technological and
societal developments that may make feelings of lacking control
and uncertainty an everyday experience, this issue has not lost
its relevance. Instead, questions of how to adaptively cope with
experiences of lack of control and uncertainty, how to encounter
their consequences, and the mechanisms of their impact on
subsequent decision-making processes are quite timely. By
applying a cross-cultural perspective, the understanding of
fundamental general functional relationships as well as cultural
inﬂuences on our everyday coping mechanisms in response to
universal challenges is fostered.
This study’s results point out that – across cultures –
emotions, more precisely, anger, might bridge the gap between
prior, subjective loss of control experiences and the subsequent
decision-making setting, and thus can account for prior
proven spillover eﬀects. Furthermore, despite the often rather
negative evaluation of anger as a socially undesirable and
unpleasant emotion, our ﬁndings may give reason to cast a
more positive light on it; anger can also be associated with
cognitions of power, control, and certainty. It seems to be
able to compensate for the discouraging eﬀects of lack of
control experiences by counteracting overly cautious behavior
and contributing to more conﬁdent, optimistic and risk-taking
decision-making. Intensiﬁed eﬀorts aimed at getting to the
bottom of the underlying mechanisms might shed further light
on the theoretical and practical opportunities and constraints of
these seemingly promising eﬀects of anger, which appear to have
the potential to support people in coping with experiences of
lacking personal control and uncertainty.
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